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Abstract—Fog and Edge computing provide a large pool
of resources at the edge of the network that may be used
for distributed computing. Fog infrastructure heterogene-
ity also results in complex configuration of distributed
applications on computing nodes. Linux containers are a
mainstream technique allowing to run packaged applica-
tions and micro services. However, running applications on
remote hosts owned by third parties is challenging because
of untrusted operating systems and hardware maintained
by third parties. To meet such challenges, we may leverage
trusted execution mechanisms. In this work, we propose
a model for distributed computing on Fog infrastructures
using Linux containers secured by Intel’s Software Guard
Extensions (SGX) technology. We implement our model on
a Docker and OpenSGX platform. The result is a secure
and flexible approach for distributed computing on Fog
infrastructures.
Index Terms—Fog computing security, distributed com-
puting, Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX), trusted
computing, secure computing, Linux containers.
I. INTRODUCTION
Fog computing extends computing resources and ser-
vices to the edge of the network to provide QoS by sup-
porting low latency and location awareness to meet end-
user requirements. This paradigm is also well positioned
for Big data and distributed computing applications due
to the large amount of computing resources accessible
through virtualization technology. Recently, Linux con-
tainers have received more attention in Fog and IoT
clouds due to their flexibility and performance benefits
compared to VMs. Distributed computing based on VMs
and Linux containers offers more security (e.g., iso-
lation) than traditional computing models e.g., user-
based. However, integrity and confidentiality remain key
concerns because of untrusted operating systems and
hosts maintained by third-parties in the cloud infras-
tructure. The primary challenge is how to execute a
distributed application securely inside VMs or in Linux
containers running on remote hosts (i.e., guaranteeing
isolated execution, data integrity and confidentiality).
Hardware-assisted trusted execution mechanisms such
as Intel’s Software Guard Extensions (SGX) and ARM
TrustZone, are highly promising to overcome such chal-
lenges. A secure component like the TPM (Trusted
Platform Module) in a computing platform plays the role
of Root of Trust (RoT) through specific embedded cryp-
tographic mechanisms. To make the platform trusted,





platform (e.g., OS) by building a Chain of Trust (CoT)
in which each element extends its trust to the next
element in the chain until launching applications. This
mechanism allows identifying any modification in the
host before launching a container [1]. However, such
mechanism is not necessarily implemented by remote
hosts especially in heterogeneous infrastructures such
as Fog, thus requiring new solutions. Intel SGX allows
executing securely sensitive part/data of an application
inside isolated zones (called enclaves) through the pro-
cessor, by encryption mechanisms to protect data from
operating system and hardware memory attacks. Conse-
quently, it allows secure execution of the application on
untrusted remote hosts. This technology can be leveraged
in distributed computing where a distributed application
should be run on remote hosts of the cloud infrastructure.
It is also integrated into Linux containers to protect
packaged applications [2].
In this paper, we discuss the challenge of trusted com-
puting on remote hosts. We review different scenarios to
secure execution of Linux containers on remote hosts
in the cloud infrastructure through trusted execution
mechanisms, and finally we propose a model for secure
distributed computing through using Linux containers
hardened by Intel SGX, to perform trusted execution on
untrusted Fog computing infrastructures.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II gives an
overview of existing methods of distributed execution of
applications in Fog computing infrastructures. Section III
discusses security challenges of computing on remote
hosts, and Section IV reviews two corresponding trusted
execution scenarios. Section V gives an outlook on the
model and implementation of our prototype and Section
VI evaluates it. Section VII reviews related works.
Section VIII concludes.
II. DISTRIBUTED COMPUTING ON FOG
INFRASTRUCTURES
In traditional models, specific OS mechanisms allow
multiplexing processor and memory between different
processes and user accounts. A distributed application
runs as a process on a remote machine through an
operating system user. However, in highly heteroge-
neous infrastructures, legacy compatibility is an issue
for the execution of distributed applications. Integrity
and confidentiality of data and isolated execution can-
not be guaranteed because security mechanisms are
implemented in the operating system of remote hosts
and managed by untrusted host administrators. In VM-
based computing, a distributed application runs on a
set of consolidated VMs. All VMs are managed by the
administrator of the distributed computing platform, al-
though VMs run on remote physical machines owned by
third parties. This computing model offers more security
for the execution of the distributed application because
of the virtualization abstraction layer. It also provides
stronger isolation and enables to implement and enforce
security mechanisms inside VMs independently of the
host, to guarantee data processing. However, the VM-
based model suffers from flexibility limitations (e.g., VM
migration) intrinsic to virtualization techniques [3]. In
container-based computing, the distributed application
is packaged in a set of containers. It then runs on hosts
managed by third parties on the Fog infrastructure in
the form of a set of containers to perform computations.
This model provides more flexibility than the VM-
based model regarding cluster building, because of fast
provisioning and easy management of Linux containers.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
We address two main challenges related to secure and





hosts. Remote Execution: In remote computing, if an
application executes directly on hosts, inside VMs, or in
Linux containers, there is always a security concern with
such computing models: how to secure (i.e., guaranteeing
isolated execution of application) remote computations?
Running an application inside VMs/Linux containers
may appear more secure than running it on hosts for iso-
lation and confidentiality. For instance, all containers/ap-
plications in a host share the same kernel instance. Thus,
any kernel compromise results in security vulnerabilities.
The same scenario applies for VMs although isolation is
stronger between VMs than containers due to enforced
isolation by the virtualization layer. An adversary may
employ Virtual Machine Introspection (VMI) [4] to
retrieve information of the VM. We may also run a
container inside a VM, to enforce isolation [5]. However,
the real challenge is the execution of the application
(either inside VMs or Linux containers) on remote hosts
maintained by untrusted third-parties (the hypervisor/OS
of hosts thus remain untrusted).
Hardware-assisted primitives provide an isolated ex-
ecution environment between running applications/con-
tainers in the host OS, or between running VMs. These
mechanisms provide integrity and confidentiality for the
execution of applications/ containers/ VMs: the memory
of applications/containers/VMs is hardware-encrypted,
and therefore protected from any unauthorized access
from untrusted OS/hypervisor. Memory encryption tech-
niques create strong isolation between applications,
application-OS, VMs, VM-hypervisor, containers, and
container-OS. However, we cannot always trust the ap-
plication running inside containers/VMs because the ap-
plication may be modified or compromised by an adver-
sary, thus resulting in information leakage or underlying
system compromise. To meet such challenge, Remote
Attestation allows remote parties to detect any change
in the application. It enables a trusted device (i.e., a
device with RoT) to present reliable evidence to remote
parties about the state of application executing on remote
hosts. This evidence may be for instance a cryptographic
signature of a hash of application.
Performance and Flexibility: For distributed comput-
ing, a large set of computing resources is needed to
run a distributed application on Fog infrastructures. How
to provision such a resource pool in an efficient way
with greater security and flexibility than the traditional
approachs? Even when using trusted computing mecha-
nisms [6] [7], challenges remain regarding fast provision-
ing and configuration on remote hosts. Linux containers
provide a reliable way of encapsulating an application
and its configuration with the flexibility of image-based
deployment methods. Therefore, distributed computing
using containers which are secured by trusted execution
mechanisms has been getting more attention for Fog
computing [3].
IV. TRUSTED EXECUTION OVER FOG
INFRASTRUCTURES
We distinguish two scenarios for trusted execution of
Linux containers on remote hosts in the Fog infrastruc-
ture (Fig. 1).
a) Trusted host: Software CoT process: Containers
are run on a cluster of trusted hosts in the infras-
tructure. Before launching a container image, a host
proves itself as trusted host by following the CoT
mechanism. The CoT starts from boot to launching the
container engine that starts with an implicitly trusted
component (i.e., RoT) and every other component trusted
before being executed (Fig. 1a). If the host is trusted,
it is added to the pool of trusted hosts which are
maintained by third parties. Consequently, the host can





verifies run-time trustworthy of the container image. If
the proof is valid, the container is authorized to be
executed on the host and the master node starts sending
data to the container for processing. Trusted Docker
containers [1], and CoreOS [8] provide such security
solutions by extending the CoT to the Linux container
image.
b) Untrusted host: hardware trusted execution:
Containers are directly launched on a cluster of un-
trusted hosts. Trusted execution mechanisms are lever-
aged in the container image encapsulating the ap-
plication, through hardware mechanisms. The under-
lying layers (i.e., container engine, OS) are con-
sidered untrusted (Fig. 1b). The application exe-
cutes in the trusted execution environement provided by
hardware. If the application is proved trusted through re-
mote attestation, it means it has not been tam-
pered with. The master node then starts sending data to
the application. This scenario is an optimized solution
not based on a CoT which is a complex process to
implement on hosts especially in heterogeneous infras-
tructures like Fog ones. This solution is preferred when
third parties do not want to implement the CoT in their
systems. SCONE [2] provides such capability by secur-
ing Docker containers leveraging Intel SGX technology.
V. SECURE DISTRIBUTED COMPUTING MODEL
We consider H = {h1, h2, ..., hn} a set of physical
machines in the Fog infrastructure with a hardware-
backed trusted execution technology te ∈ T E– set
of trusted computing technologies. We also consider
C = {c1, c2, ..., ck} a set of containers to run on H.
We introduce a software component sc ∈ SC– set of
software components, to be integrated in the container
image c. c is composed of sc and u ∈ U– set of base
images used to provide some libraries to the software.
Any modification in sc and u results in new container
image c
′ ∈ C ′– set of tampered images. Thus the Tam-
per operation on c denoted as follows:
Tamper : SC × U → C
′
, (sc, u) 7→ c
′
(1)
We also consider dataset D = {d1, d2, ..., dk} to be
processed by containers and R = {r1, r2, ..., rk} the
result of data processing. The Process operation of di
by container ci through te on hj is defined as follows:
Process : D × C ×H× T E → R, (di, ci, hj , te) 7→ r
(2)
Definition. ci is a trusted container if its whole image
has not been tampered with and proved as such through
a hardware-assisted remote attestation mechanism pro-
vided by the trusted execution technology te available
on hosts in H.
Trust Model: Our model leverages Intel SGX as
trusted execution technology, and employs scenario
b. Thus, critical parts of the application deployed in
the container are protected inside enclaves. Other parts
outside enclaves, are unprotected. Although all network
links are encrypted between hosts by network security
protocols such as IPSec, the network is not trusted.
(a) (b)






Figure 2: End-to-end encryption between two enclaves.
Thus security between the application in the container
and the master application is enforced through encryp-
tion mechanisms to guarantee end-to-end confidential-
ity. Intel SGX provides some mechanisms to encrypt
communications between two enclaves. Keys used by
enclaves are also stored inside the enclave protected
by hardware. Thus, only the application has access to
keys, and communications between enclaves of slave
and master applications are encrypted (Fig. 2).
Container Deployment: The first step to build the
distributed computing environment is the deployment
of containers on physical machines. Different orchestra-







Add ci to Ct
Figure 3: Join protocol: adding a container to a trusted
cluster.
tion frameworks enable to manage a set of containers
e.g., Kubernetes, on hosts.
Trusted Cluster Creation: To build a trusted cluster
composed of several trusted nodes, when a new container
ci wishes to be integrated to the cluster Ct , it initiates the
join protocol (Fig. 3). It consists of a remote attestation
mechanism to prove the container as a trusted node, by
communicating with the master node. If the container is
approved as a trusted node (i.e., the application deployed
in the container has not been tampered with), the node
is integrated to the cluster and the master starts to send
data to the approved container for processing. Otherwise,
the node is considered untrusted because the packaged
application has been tampered with.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
To implement our prototype, we need a container im-
age (u) that provides Intel SGX mechanisms to the appli-
cation running within container. We used OpenSGX [9],
a research platform for developing SGX-based applica-
tions. It implements and emulates Intel SGX ecosystem
instructions, and hardware components leveraging the
QEMU emulator. OpenSGX provides certain mecha-
nisms available in SGX supported processors.
To evaluate the model, we implemented a MapRe-
duce distributed computing framework based on Linux
containers, to count number of words in a text file.
MapReduce being well-recognized for its scalability and
flexibility, decomposing an application into microser-
vices. In the prototype, we have three types of nodes:
Mapper, Reducer, and Master. The Master splits jobs/-
data and distributes them to Mapper nodes. Then, Map-
pers perform their computing jobs and return the results
back to Reducers for merging. Finally, Reducers send
results to the Master node. Our experimental prototype
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(c) Number of context switches
Figure 4: Performance of Mapper and Reducer nodes with and w/o Intel SGX.
model, we consider that data to be processed by nodes
are sensitive. Thus, they must be protected inside Intel
SGX enclaves. Lesser critical sections of the application
such as network functions are thus placed outside of the
enclave and not protected by Intel SGX.
To evaluate the performance overhead of executing
SGX instructions on computing nodes (i.e., Linux con-
tainers) running Mapper and Reducer programs, we mea-
sure execution time, CPU cycles, and Context switching
when SGX is enabled/not-enabled. We use a Dell i5-
3340M @2.70GHz with 8GB of RAM, running Ubuntu
14.04.
Node execution time: As shown in Fig. 4a, the
execution time of a complete workflow of a client node
is higher than normal execution when using Intel SGX.
We verified this difference through Linux perf. This
additional execution time is caused by SGX special
instructions, SGX library calls, enclave initialization, and
memory encryption mechanisms.
Number of CPU cycles: We measured the number of
CPU cycles when SGX was enabled (Fig. 4b). Using
SGX results execution of a higher number of instruc-
tions because of instructions used by SGX to pro-
cess data and code in enclaves.
Context switching: Another phenomenon that has
impact on the performance of SGX applications is
context switching between the enclave and the rest of
application. During the execution of the application,
enclave data and code processing leads to CPU mode
changes. Therefore, each enclave enter/exit requires to
store/restore CPU states, operations which are costly in
terms of performance. Fig. 4c shows the number of
context-switches incurred in the execution of Mapper
and Reducer nodes. Overall, Intel SGX instructions
impose w11.2% performance overhead to Mapper and
Reducer nodes. This is essentially the overhead of using
OpenSGX in our prototype (i.e., performance emulation
of Intel SGX).
Our prototype leverages Intel SGX enclaves, thus pro-
vides the same security guarantees which are provided by
Intel SGX. Intel SGX (like other existing trusted comput-
ing approaches), protects the software against memory
attacks such as malicious OS, malicious hypervisor, and
malicious firmware. However, it does not protect against
cache-based side-channel attacks [10].
VII. RELATED WORKS
Zhang et al. [6] proposed an approach for secure com-





machines. Their approach implements trusted computing
mechanisms using TPM to guarantee data privacy and se-
curity. CoreOS [8] is a minimal Linux OS to run Linux
containers especially those that are Docker-based. It pro-
vides a secure and reliable cluster for running distributed
applications. It leverages Kubernetes for cluster manage-
ment and Docker for application management. It also
offers a trusted execution environment leveraging the
CoT mechanism. CoreOS extends the CoT to container
image by implementing specific mechanisms in rkt [11]
container engine to provide the remote attestation.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have seen that containers hardened by a trusted
execution technology like Intel SGX bring more flex-
ibility and security to distributed computing. We pro-
posed a container-based model for secure distributed
computing over Fog infrastructures. To illustrate the
model, we implemented a container-based MapReduce
prototype. Evaluation results show a reasonable perfor-
mance overhead of using Intel SGX. As future work,
we intend to explore AMD-SEV for Linux containers.
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